Balinski and Young described a "quota method" for congressional apportionment and recommended it as "the only method satisfying three essential axioms" [Balinski, M. L. & Young, H. P. (1974) Proc. NatL Acad. Sci. USA 71, 4602406]. This paper points out and repairs a slight defect in one of those axioms, producing a quota method slightly different from that described previous It also presents an alternative to the "consistency" axiom of the paper and describes the "dual quota" method, uniquely satisfying the alternative axioms (which have exactly as much justification as the originals). We may think of an apportionment method as an effective intepretation of the words "suitable" and "to approximate." Thanks to the clear distinction made by Balinski and Young (1, 2) between "solutions" and "methods," the present paper can largely disregard the rare but vexatious "ties," such as occur when two states have exactly equal populations. 2. The work of Balinski and Young Balinski and Young (1) described an apportionment method, the "quota method," that satisfied three axioms intended to summarize the essential desiderata. The first axiom, "housem. notonicity," excludes the Alabama paradox (see section 5 below). The second axiom, "the quota condition," limits the discrepancy between the exact quota and any acceptable apportionment. The third axiom, "consistency," excludes capricious or discriminatory methods. They (1, 2) presented a precise and a very general definition of a "consistent" method as well as general background and further references. In fact, they stated (1) and proved (2) that the quota method is the unique method to satisfy all three axioms, even if minima (but not maxima) are imposed on the portions of the various states. Although the maxima specified in the Constitution will not influence the results of any known apportionment method for the present 435-seat Congress, they influenced Washington's decision to veto the first apportionment bill. I allow for both maxima and minima, to reveal the full duality described in section 4 below. (pjr,b,h) as above, with pi, ri, bi, and h integral, pi > 0,0 < ri < bi, and fri = h,* < h < h* = Zbi. An apportionment for the problem (p,r,b,h) is an s-tuple a = (al,. . ., a.) of integers called portions, with ri S a, < bi for each i, and 2at = h.
The apportionment problem
The apportionment problem is to allocate the h seats of a legislature (or "house") among s states in proportion to their respective populations, p1, . . ., Ps, subject to overriding minima, r1, .. ., rs, and maxima, b1, . . ., bs. If each state could receive a nonintegral number of seats, an easy calculation (formalized in section 3 below) would specify the correct apportionment; the resulting numbers are called the exact quotas of the respective states. But each state must receive an integral number of seats, and therefore some suitable integers must be used to approximate the exact quotas. We may think of an apportionment method as an effective intepretation of the words "suitable" and "to approximate." Thanks to the clear distinction made by Balinski and Young (1, 2) between "solutions" and "methods," the present paper can largely disregard the rare but vexatious "ties," such as occur when two states have exactly equal populations. 2. The work of Balinski and Young Balinski and Young (1) described an apportionment method, the "quota method," that satisfied three axioms intended to summarize the essential desiderata. The first axiom, "housem. notonicity," excludes the Alabama paradox (see section 5 below). The second axiom, "the quota condition," limits the discrepancy between the exact quota and any acceptable apportionment. The third axiom, "consistency," excludes capricious or discriminatory methods. They (1, 2) presented a precise and a very general definition of a "consistent" method as well as general background and further references. In fact, they stated (1) and proved (2) that the quota method is the unique method to satisfy all three axioms, even if minima (but not maxima) are imposed on the portions of the various states. Although the maxima specified in the Constitution will not influence the results of any known apportionment method for the present 435-seat Congress, they influenced Washington's decision to veto the first apportionment bill. I allow for both maxima and minima, to reveal the full duality described in section 4 below. Once maxima as well as minima are considered in apportionment problems, a duality can be defined in which: maxima correspond with minima; Huntington's method (5) of smallest divisors corresponds with his method of greatest divisors; an upward induction (using house sizes increasing from h*,to h*) corresponds with a downward induction; "greater than" corresponds with "less than"; lower quota corresponds with upper quota (as the latter is defined in this paper); and the method of major fractions corresponds with itself. Thus, for example, any proof that the method of smallest divisors satisfies upper quota 1  1  2  1  1  1  2  15  15  15  15  15  3  2  2  2  3  37  40  40  39  39  11  11  11  11  10  2  1  1  1  2  22  23  23  23  23  6  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  5  24  26  26  26  25  3  2  2  2  3  6   16   6  6  6   2  1  1  1  2  8  8  8  8  8  23  24  24  24  24  3  2  2  2  3  1  1  1  1  1  10  10  10 can be translated (by a purely mechanical process) into a proof condition of ref. 1 is not self-dual-the dual quota method that the method of greatest divisors satisfies lower quota.
satisfies a consistency condition dual to that satisfied by the Under this duality, the quota method of refs. 1 and 2-dequota method. Other monotone methods have been found that fining "upper quota" as above-will correspond to another satisfy quota; it happens that quota and dual quota are the algorithm, to be called the dual quota method, which will have easiest to define and to compute (see section 8 below).
exactly as much basis for acceptability as the quota method itself. Similarly, the proof that the quota method is the unique
The Alabama paradox method satisfying the three axioms of Balinski and Young
The importance of house-monotonicity can be seen by contranslates into a proof that the dual quota method is the unique sidering the "Vinton" or "Hamilton" method-viz: "Give each method satisfying three equally reasonable axioms.
state its lower quota, and one more seat to each of the h -e The dual quota method The concepts of dual-eligibility and dual-consistent can be derived from the above definitions; if we consider the sequence of states that lose seats as the house decreases from h* to h* -1, ... h we define the dual-eligible set at h as the set E'(h) = {i If,(h + 1) > qi(h)j of states that could lose the (h + 1)th seat without violating lower quota. We then define a solution f as dual-consistent if the choice of the losing state is governed by priority within the dual-eligible set, where relative priority of two states is determined by their populations and previous (i.e., at the next-higher house-size) portions. It is natural that in this case an analog of the method of smallest divisors (which intrinsically satisfies upper quota) has the desired properties. The modified proof mentioned above may be translated mechanically into a proof of the following theorem.
THEOREM. There exists a unique dual-consistent housemonotone method satisfying quota. That method, called the dual-quota method, is the set of all solutions 1 obtained recursively as follows: (i) j1'j(p, r, b,h*) = bi for all i; (ii) Given as = 41i(p,r,b,h) and E'(h -1) = lilaI > qj(h -1)j, let k be a state in E'(h -1) such that Pk/(ak -1) < pl/(aj -1) for all i in E'(h -1). Then fk(h -1) = a -1, S(h -1) = as for i F'< k.
8. Other house-monotone methods satisfying quota Instead of replacing the "consistency" condition of ref. 1 by its dual, we might modify the definition of "eligible set" (and thus of "consistency") by defining a state to be eligible at h if that state could receive the next (h'th) seat without causing the resulting apportionment to violate either upper or lower quota. Clearly, the quota method is still consistent under this definition; examples have shown that the dual quota method is not, although it would satisfy the dual of the new condition. It is uncertain whether the quota method would remain the unique method under this new definition; at any rate, the uniqueness-proof given in ref. 2 2) imply that a nonquota apportionment is unconstitutional; that viewpoint was apparently not explored mathematically until refs. 1 and 2 were published. If a method satisfying quota is to be selected, should it be the quota method or the dual quota method, or some other (see section 8)? Quota inherits from greatest divisors the tendency to favor large states, whereas dual quota inherits from smallest divisors the tendency to favor small states; all the other quota methods are in that respect "between" these two. This author's preference would be for the quota analog of major fractions, which happens to be self-dual; good cases can also be made for the quota analog of the Hamilton-Vinton method and for the quota analog of equal proportions. Any one of these three would be an attractive compromise between quota and dual quota, much as equal proportions was an attractive compromise between greatest divisors and smallest divisors.
